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Abstract
The impact of separating cash ￿ ow and votes depends on the ownership structure.
In widely held ￿rms, one share - one vote is in general not optimal. While it ensures
an e¢ cient outcome in bidding contests, dual-class shares mitigate the free-rider prob-
lem, thereby promoting takeovers. In the presence of a controlling shareholder, one
share - one vote promotes value-increasing control transfers and deters value-decreasing
control transfers more e⁄ectively than any other vote allocation. Moreover, leveraging
the insider￿ s voting power aggravates agency con￿ icts because it protects her from the
takeover threat and provides less alignment with other shareholders. Even so, minor-
ity shareholder protection is not a compelling argument for regulatory intervention, as
rational investors anticipate the insider￿ s opportunism. Rather, the rationale for man-
dating one share - one vote must be to disempower controlling minority shareholders in
order to promote value-increasing takeovers. As this policy tends to empower managers
vis-￿-vis shareholders, it is an open question whether it would improve the quality of
corporate governance, notably in systems built around large active owners. The verdict
in the case of depositary certi￿cates, priority shares, voting and ownership ceilings is less
ambiguous, since they insulate managers from both takeovers and e⁄ective shareholder
monitoring
JEL Classi￿cations: G32
Keywords: Security-Voting Structure, Market for Corporate Control, Controlling Mi-
nority ShareholdersI Introduction
The most important contractual right that shareholders have is widely taken to be their right to vote
on important corporate matters (Manne, 1965; Easterbrook and Fischel, 1983). That provided, the
question arises how voting rights should be allocated among shareholders. At ￿rst glance, it seems
natural to demand that shareholders who supply equal amounts of capital or hold equal claims
should have equal opportunity to in￿ uence decisions. However, the one share - one vote principle
is often violated in reality. Among the top 300 European companies 35 percent deviated in 2005
from the one share - one vote principle (Deminor Rating, 2005). In North America, such deviations
are less frequent but still common (Chemmanur and Jiao, 2006). The fraction of listed ￿rms with
dual-class shares is about 10 percent in the US and about 22 percent in Canada (Toronto Stock
Exchange Index).
Corporate voting practices have varied over time as much as they vary across countries today.
Deviations from one share - one vote can be traced back to ancient Rome, where so-called publicani
issued di⁄erent shares to the wealthy and to the wider public (Chancellor, 1999). During the Middle
Ages, the common practice in Europe evolved from a one member - one vote standard to a variety
of disproportional voting structures, some favouring small or medium-sized shareholders, others
enhancing the control of large shareholders (Dunlavy, 1998; Pistor et al., 2003). Early US practices
typically limited the voting power of individual shareholders but by the beginning of the twentieth
century ￿rms empowered dominant shareholders by selling non-voting shares to smaller shareholders
(Manne, 1964). Following the uprise against Big Business, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
disallowed in 1926 the listing of ￿rms with non-voting stock (Seligman, 1986). Both in the US
and in Europe, issues of inferior voting stock then became rather uncommon until the latter half
of the 20th century when their (re-)appearance often concurred with takeover waves (Jarrell and
Poulsen, 1988; Rydqvist, 1992). The NYSE abandoned the one share - one vote requirement in 1986
bowing to competitive pressure from the American Stock Exchange and NASDAQ, both of which
admitted ￿rms with multiple share classes. In Europe, a number of countries concurrently changed
their laws to accommodate deviations (Arruæada and Paz-Ares, 1995), but more recently the trend
has reversed (again). Regulation is by and large becoming more restrictive, and the frequency
of deviations is gradually decreasing towards the US level (Goergen et al., 2005; Pajuste, 2005).
Moreover, di⁄erences at the national level fuel the ongoing debate about a EU-wide prohibition of
1deviations, a policy issue intimately related to the European takeover regulation (Ferrarini, 2006)
and the call for stronger shareholder rights (Deminor Rating, 2005).
This paper reviews the theoretical economic literature on the one share - one vote principle.
(Adams and Ferreira (2007) provide a survey of the empirical literature.) We focus on how the
allocation of voting rights across share classes, henceforth the security-voting structure, a⁄ects the
dynamics of control allocation and the incentives of those entrusted with managing the ￿rm. To
examine these e⁄ects, we use the simple dual-class structure with voting and non-voting shares, both
entitled to the same (pro-rata) dividends, as the representative means to separate cash ￿ ow and
voting rights. This is not a restrictive simpli￿cation because any control and cash ￿ ow allocation
put in place by more complex dual or multi-class structures can be reproduced by the simple
structure.1
There are other ways than dual-class structures to deviate from the one share - one vote rule.
First, even if all shares carry the same number of votes, a ￿rm￿ s corporate charter may include
provisions that undermine (the spirit of) the one share - one vote principle. For instance, it may
include ownership or voting ceilings that restrict the purchase of shares or the exercise of the votes
above a certain limit. Another device is to issue priority shares that grant their holders extra-
ordinary decision powers in speci￿c matters. Since these deviations protect incumbent managers
against intervention by outside investors, we refer to them as lock-in mechanisms. These mech-
anisms cannot be replicated by the simple dual-class share structure and are therefore discussed
separately.
Second, a wedge between cash ￿ ow rights and voting rights can also be created by linking
multiple ￿rms, each with a single share class, through pyramids or cross-ownership structures. A
pyramid consists of a hierarchy of ￿rms in which higher-tier ￿rms own shares in lower-tier ￿rms.
This device allows to attain a controlling minority structure and is often chosen for this purpose.
For instance, a three-tier pyramid enables a party to fully control the bottom-tier ￿rm while holding
merely 12,5 percent of its cash ￿ ow rights. It only requires a majority stake in the top-tier ￿rm
which owns a majority stake in the middle-tier ￿rm which in turn owns a majority stake in the
bottom-tier. The leverage is achieved by transforming the remaining shares in each tier into de
1In practice, dual-class structures may comprise a superior class with multiple votes per share as in e.g., Sweden,
or non-voting shares with or without preferential dividends as in e.g., Germany and Italy. National regulations
usually impose a minimum ratio of votes per inferior share to votes per superior share, e.g., 1/10, or some minimum
proportion of voting shares e.g., 50 percent (Rydqvist, 1992).
2facto non-voting shares. By chaining more ￿rms, the wedge between cash ￿ ow rights and voting
rights can be substantially increased without losing control over the ￿rms in the pyramid.2 In
cross-ownership structures ￿rms own shares in each other. Thus, the voting rights used to control
a group of ￿rms are distributed over the entire group rather than concentrated in the hands of a
single party (Bebchuk et al., 2000).
The insights about the impact of the dual-class share structure on control transfers and agency
con￿ icts also apply to pyramids and cross-ownership. The reason is the same as in the case of
multi-class share structures: Any allocation of cash ￿ ow and voting rights, notably controlling
minority structures, achievable through cross-ownership and pyramids can be replicated by the
simple dual-class structure (Bebchuk et al., 2000). In addition, pyramids and cross-ownership
ful￿ll other functions. They allow ￿rms to create an internal labor and capital market or facilitate
vertical and horizontal integration (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2005; Khanna and Yafeh, 2006). We
do not cover these aspects of business groups here.
Third, recent capital market developments have made it easier and cheaper for shareholders
to trade their cash ￿ ow rights or voting rights with other investors, thereby unbundling the ￿rms￿
security-voting structure. For instance, stock options allow a shareholder to hedge her direct
￿nancial interest in a ￿rm while retaining her voting rights. At the same time, her counterparty
assumes a ￿nancial interest in the ￿rm without any corresponding (formal) in￿ uence. Conversely,
the security-lending market allows investors to borrow votes without assuming any ￿rm-related
economic risk. When an investor borrows a share from its legal owner, the dividends ultimately
still accrue to the lending shareholder but the vote may be exercised by the borrower.
If votes and cash ￿ ow rights can be fully unbundled through market transactions, the security-
voting structure loses its relevance (Hart, 1995). Any shareholder can privately engineer her desired
combination of cash ￿ ow and voting rights, including extreme deviations from one share - one vote.
A particular disconcerting issue is that an investor could in principle own voting rights of a ￿rm in
which she has a negative economic interest (Martin and Partnoy, 2005). Although there exist some
evidence of increased vote trading around major corporate events (Christo⁄ersen et al., 2005), it is
yet unclear to what extent and how vote trading systematically a⁄ects corporate decision-making.
2In East Asia, where multiple share classes are commonly prohibited, many business groups rely on pyramids and
cross-ownership to concentrate control (Claessens et al., 2000). In Europe pyramids are used by 19 percent of listed
European ￿rms that have a controlling shareholder at the 20 percent level (Faccio and Lang, 2002).
3Given these transactions are beyond the control of the ￿rm, an examination of these deviations
requires an analysis of the markets in which they take place. This is beyond the scope of this
survey, and we refer the reader to a small but growing literature on this subject (Blair et al., 1989;
Hu and Black, 2006a, 2006b; Neeman and Orosel, 2006).
This survey proceeds as follows. Section II provides a conceptual framework to analyze the role
of corporate voting rights. Section III examines the impact of the security-voting structure on tender
o⁄ers and negotiated control sales. Section IV analyzes how the security-voting structure in￿ uences
the e⁄ectiveness of blockownership as a governance mechanism. Section V investigates the ex-ante
e⁄ects that the security-voting structure has through its impact on the takeover threat. Section
VI describes lock-in mechanisms and their e⁄ects. Section VII discusses the policy implications,
notably the case for mandating one share - one vote. Section VIII concludes the theoretical survey.
II Conceptual Framework
The standard justi￿cation for one share - one vote is based on two broad arguments. First, residual
control rights should rest with shareholders because they are the residual claimants and thus have
the strongest interest in maximizing ￿rm value (e.g., Easterbrook and Fischel, 1983, 1991). Second,
voting power should match economic incentives, i.e., shareholders should be able to voice their
opinion in proportion to their owned risk-capital (e.g., Black and Kraakman, 1996).
These arguments, although intuitively appealing, are not indisputable. In practice, there exist
other stakeholders whose claims are in part or under certain circumstances residual (Black, 1999).3
Accordingly, some of them are endowed with residual control rights, though not necessarily in the
form of ordinary voting rights. For instance, creditors receive control rights that are contingent on
default or on violations of loan covenants; and in some countries law mandates that employees be
represented on the board of directors. Moreover, even among providers of risk-capital, it is debatable
whether allocating control rights proportionally to invested risk-capital is indeed optimal. Publicly
3The argument that shareholders are the sole residual claimants relies on the presumption that the claims of other
stakeholders are fully protected by contracts. This does not hold when either contracts or markets are incomplete
(Tirole, 2001; Allen, 2005; Allen and Gale, 2002). Moreover, giving control solely to shareholders may not even
maximize shareholder value (Allen et al., 2006). Nonetheless, shareholder control is commonly considered to be a
second-best solution because shareholders are the most vulnerable residual claimants and because splitting decision
rights among con￿ icting parties creates haggling costs and entails ill-de￿ned performance measures (Becht et al.,
2003; Tirole, 2001).
4listed ￿rms apart, there exist many ￿nancing arrangements in which disproportional voting rights
are part of sophisticated contracts. For instance, private equity and hedge funds are typically
run by general partners, while limited partners have no voting power and are solely protected
by covenants and a limited investment period. Similarly, contracts between venture capitalists
and entrepreneurs typically allocate cash ￿ ow rights separately from voting rights (Kaplan and
Str￿mberg, 2003). Another example is the possibility to incorporate a ￿rm as a limited partnership
where partners have di⁄erential voting rights despite contributing similar amounts of risk-capital
(e.g., the ￿ SociØtØs en Commandite par Actions￿in France).
Over the last twenty years, the incomplete contract paradigm has emerged as the standard tool
to analyze how to allocate control and cash ￿ ow rights. This approach posits that even highly
sophisticated contracts do not fully specify a ￿rm￿ s (future) course of action. As time evolves, new
unforeseen eventualities and opportunities arise to which the ￿rm has to respond. The ￿rm therefore
needs to choose who takes such residual decisions. However, the necessity to take a decision does not
as such imply that the allocation of decision-making authority matters. For instance, if all members
of the ￿rm are equally a⁄ected by a decision, there is full agreement and it is immaterial which
member gets to decide. One reason why the allocation of control rights matters is the presence
of an agency problem or con￿ ict of interest. Indeed, the corporate governance literature is based
on the premise of such con￿ icts of interest, usually among corporate insiders (top management or
controlling blockholder) and outside investors (minority shareholders or creditors).
Following the seminal paper by Aghion and Bolton (1992), much of the theoretical research
explores the relevance of control rights in a setting with an entrepreneur and a single investor.
Control rights are modeled as the power to choose among alternative actions, and each action
entails two kinds of bene￿ts: security bene￿ts or cash ￿ ows that can be shared between entrepreneur
and investor, and non-transferable private bene￿ts that accrue exclusively to the entrepreneur.
Examples of private bene￿ts are prestige, consumption of perquisites, excessive salaries, or the sale
of assets below market value to another ￿rm fully owned by the entrepreneur. The existence of
these private bene￿ts creates a potential con￿ ict and hence a role for control rights. If the investor
has the control right, she picks the alternative that maximizes her share of the security bene￿ts.
By contrast, the entrepreneur opts for the alternative that maximizes the sum of private bene￿ts
and her share of the security bene￿ts. Thus, the parties may disagree over the choice of action in
5which case the outcome depends on the allocation of the control rights. Moreover, the party in
control need not take the socially e¢ cient decision.
If the party in control, say the investor, indeed picks an ine¢ cient decision, her gains are by
de￿nition smaller than the loss for the entrepreneur. Consequently, the entrepreneur should be
willing to o⁄er a payment that persuades the investor to pick instead the entrepreneur￿ s preferred
action, or equivalently, sell the decision right. Thus, even though control rights matter, their initial
allocation does not a⁄ect the outcome: the parties reach the e¢ cient decision through renegotiation.
Such renegotiation may, however, not be feasible for various reasons. One impediment empha-
sized in the corporate ￿nance context is the entrepreneur￿ s limited wealth. That is, the entrepreneur
may not have su¢ cient wealth to compensate the investor in return for the forgone gains that the
investor would realize with her most preferred action. In fact, limited wealth is most often the
reason why the entrepreneur approached the investor in the ￿rst place. Otherwise, she could have
undertaken the venture without the investor (Hart, 2001).4
The allocation of votes among shareholders is both a more complex and narrower question
than how control should be divided between an entrepreneur and a single investor. One the one
hand, the dispersion of control among a potentially large number of investors (shareholders) gives
rise to new issues, in particular coordination and delegation problems. On the other hand, the
(extent of) control rights allocated to the shareholders as a collective - as opposed to e.g., the
board - are typically taken as given. Nonetheless, the basic insights from the entrepreneur-single
investor relationship continue to apply. First, if all shareholders agree on the course of action, the
allocation of votes is immaterial. Any group of voting shareholders takes the same decision, and
shareholders are therefore indi⁄erent with respect to the allocation of voting rights. Second, voting
rights are valuable in the presence of con￿ icting interests, but the initial allocation need not a⁄ect
the outcome. Indeed, if votes can be traded without frictions, the action with the largest sum of
security bene￿ts and private bene￿ts will eventually be chosen, irrespective of the initial allocation.
This outcome may not be reached for generic reasons (e.g., wealth-constraints) and reasons
more speci￿c to publicly traded corporations. First, the ownership structure can be an obstacle
4The failure to renegotiate under investor control does not imply that entrepreneur control is necessarily optimal.
Under entrepreneur control, the chosen action may yield large private bene￿ts but little security bene￿ts, thereby
precluding the investor from earning a return. Anticipating this, the investor may not be willing to ￿nance the
venture. Hence, investor control may be a prerequisite to secure ￿nancing as it is a means to increase security
bene￿ts (Tirole, 2001).
6to an e¢ cient market for votes or corporate control. On the one hand, dispersed shareholders as
a group may bargain too aggressively because each of them perceives her decision as negligible for
the takeover outcome. As a result, a would-be acquirer may be unable to earn a pro￿t even though
the takeover would be e¢ cient. This is the well-known free-rider problem identi￿ed by Grossman
and Hart (1980a). On the other hand, the coordination failure of dispersed shareholders may cause
controlling blocks to be kept or purchased by a party that does not generate the largest sum of
private and security bene￿ts. Since the value of the controlling block comprises all private bene￿ts
but only part of the security bene￿ts, a surplus from a block trade does not imply e¢ ciency nor
does e¢ ciency imply a surplus. Section III examines to what extent the security-voting structure
mitigates or exacerbates these ine¢ ciencies, thereby a⁄ecting the outcome of takeovers. 5
Second, vote trading ensures e¢ cient decisions only if all shareholders are fully informed about
the actions available and associated payo⁄s. This requirement is rarely met in large ￿rms where
shareholders do not exercise their control rights on a day-to-day basis but delegate it to the board
and the management. Moreover, dispersed shareholders have little incentive to acquire the neces-
sary information to monitor the management. As a result, corporate insiders enjoy considerable
discretion in running the ￿rm, which they may abuse to pursue their own interest. Unless there
exist checks and balances on managerial behavior, the delegation of control is therefore likely to
lead to an outcome that is not in the collective interest of the shareholders. One favored mecha-
nism for mitigating the manager-shareholder con￿ ict is partial ownership and control concentration
in the hands of a large shareholder.6 Section IV ￿Ownership Concentration and Security-Voting
Structure￿discusses how the security-voting structure a⁄ects the e⁄ectiveness of blockownership as
a governance mechanism. In addition, a ￿rm￿ s ownership and control structure a⁄ects the extent
to which hostile control transfers are feasible. The threat of losing control can a⁄ect a broad range
of corporate decisions. Section V "Contestable Control and Security-Voting Structure" analyzes
these ex-ante e⁄ects of takeovers and the possible interactions with the security-voting structure.
5The security-voting structure, notably ownership and voting ceilings, may be the very reason why an e¢ cient
decision is not reached. We discuss such ceilings and other lock-in mechanisms in section VI.
6Other important governance mechanisms are the ￿nancial structure, the board of directors, product market
competition and legal investor protection (Allen and Gale, 2000; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). As the e⁄ectiveness
of these mechanisms varies across ￿rms and countries, the importance and prevalence of ownership concentration
depends on the respective governance system.
7III Control Transfers and Security-Voting Structure
A well-functioning takeover market subjects ￿rms to a continuous auction process: Whenever an
outside party is able to improve the value of the ￿rm￿ s existing resources it can bid for its control and
replace the incumbent management. In principle, ￿rms should therefore be ultimately owned and
managed by those who maximize their value (Manne, 1965; Jensen and Ruback, 1983). However, the
theoretical literature identi￿es various reasons that impair an ex-post e¢ cient control allocation,
notably incentive and coordination problems inherent in the takeover process.7 Our concern is
whether dual-class share structures mitigate or exacerbate these frictions and ine¢ ciencies. If so,
we also explore whether shareholders and corporate insiders choose structures that minimize these
frictions, thereby promoting an e¢ cient control allocation.
Much of the takeover literature presupposes a publicly listed target ￿rm with dispersed owner-
ship and freely tradeable shares. By contrast, the empirical evidence shows that outside the UK
and US most companies, even the listed ones, have a large shareholder (La Porta et al., 1999;
Barca and Becht, 2001; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002). While dual-class shares
are frequently used to enhance the large shareholder￿ s control (votes), thereby hindering or even
preventing hostile takeovers, dispersedly held dual-class ￿rms are by no means unusual. For in-
stance, in the sample of Pajuste (2005) which covers dual-class ￿rms from seven European countries
(Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) during 1996 to 2002, the
two largest shareholders own together less than 20 percent of the votes in about a quarter of the
￿rms.8 We therefore examine the role of the security-voting structure for both dispersedly held
￿rms and ￿rms with a controlling shareholder.
7There are several reviews of the takeover literature, including Andrade et al. (2001), Bhagat et al. (1990), Becht
et al. (2003), Bruner (2002), Burkart and Panunzi (2006), Holmstr￿m and Kaplan (2001), Hirshleifer (1995), Jensen
(1988), McCahery et al. (2004), Scherer (1988) and von Thadden (1990).
8In the sample of Bennedsen and Nielsen (2004), ultimate control is dispersed in about 57 percent of 1035 European
dual-class ￿rms, i.e., no group that comprises every ultimate owner with at least 5 percent of the votes holds collectively
the majority. For the 500 largest ￿rms, this ￿gure is above 67 percent. However, these ￿gures are likely to overestimate
the incidence of dispersed control, as ultimate control in this sample is measured by the weakest link along the control
chain. For instance, if a family owns 20 percent of ￿rm A, which in turn owns 50 percent of ￿rm B, then this family
is said to ultimately control 20 percent of ￿rm B (Faccio and Lang, 2002).
8A Tender O⁄ers
In a typical tender o⁄er, the acquiring ￿rm, henceforth the bidder, o⁄ers to purchase the shares
of dispersed shareholders for cash or in exchange for other securities. If a majority of shares is
tendered, the bidder gains control over the target ￿rm. In this section, we presuppose that such a
public tender o⁄er is indeed feasible. In particular, we assume that there are neither restrictions on
the accumulation of shares or votes, nor priority shares endowed with veto power, nor controlling
shareholders.
Our analysis of the tender o⁄er process considers a widely held target ￿rm that is approached by
a bidder who does not own any shares prior to the o⁄er. The ￿rm has a dual-class share structure
with nv 2 f1;:::ng voting shares, the remaining (n ￿ nv) shares being non-voting. (For nv = n,
the dual-class structure is reduced to one share - one vote.) If the incumbent management remains
in control, shareholders obtain the security bene￿ts xI per share, while the bidder is known to
generate security bene￿ts xB per share once she is in control.
To gain control, the bidder submits an unrestricted o⁄er, conditional on getting at least 50
percent of the voting shares. If the ￿rm has a dual-class structure (nv 6= n), the bidder may quote
di⁄erent prices for voting and non-voting shares.9 However, if she submits a price for a certain
share class, she has to buy all tendered shares from that class, conditional upon a control transfer.10
In the models reviewed below, discriminating between share classes is part of the optimal bidding
strategy. Bidders make an o⁄er only for voting shares because non-voting shares are of no use in
gaining control and cannot be purchased at a price below the (expected) post-takeover value.
To succeed, a bidder must not only win the approval of a majority of the shareholders (owning
voting shares), but also outbid any competing o⁄er. The takeover outcome (bid price) and hence
the impact of the security-voting structure depends on which of the two constraints binds. We
consider the cases of an o⁄er by a single bidder and of bidding competition in turn.
9The obligation to o⁄er all share classes the same terms (coattail provision) is tantamount to imposing the one
share - one vote structure, thereby making the choice of security-voting structure in case of a takeover meaningless.
10The assumption that a bid has to be unrestricted for a given class is not crucial. Indeed, one can easily replicate
the analysis of intra-class restricted bids by rede￿ning nv. For example, restricted o⁄ers for half of the voting shares
amounts to n
0
v = nv=2. Indeed, the analysis of restricted vs unrestricted bids is analogous to that of single-class
vs. dual-class structures (Bergst￿m et al., 1997).
9A.1 Single Bidder
The seminal paper by Grossman and Hart (1980a) shows that the market for corporate control
(votes) may not function e¢ ciently even though ￿or precisely because ￿votes are dispersedly held.
We brie￿ y review their argument as it is central to the understanding of how the security-voting
structure a⁄ects the target shareholders￿decision to accept a bid.
Free-rider problem Suppose the target ￿rm has only voting shares (nv = n) held by a very
large number of shareholders such that each perceives her tendering decision to have a negligible
impact on the takeover outcome.11 When deciding to accept an o⁄er with a (per share) price p,
each shareholder compares the bene￿ts and costs of tendering in case of success and failure. If the
bid fails, the o⁄er becomes void and the choice is irrelevant. If the o⁄er succeeds, the shareholder
gets the bid price p when tendering and the post-takeover security bene￿ts xB when retaining her
share. Thus, for any price below the post-takeover security bene￿ts, each shareholder prefers not
to tender. As all shareholders behave in the same manner, the lowest price at which the bidder can
succeed is p = xB. At this price the bidder makes no pro￿t on the shares purchased in the tender
o⁄er. If the bidder incurs some cost K in making the bid, the takeover will not take place even if
it is e¢ cient (n
￿
xB ￿ xI￿
> K). That is, value-increasing takeovers of dispersedly held ￿rms fail,
unless the bidder has a private source of gains or means to appropriate part of the post-takeover
security bene￿ts.
The theoretical literature suggests several ways how the bidder may (partially) overcome the
free-rider problem, such as e.g., the dilution of minority shareholder cash ￿ ow rights (Grossman
and Hart, 1980a), the acquisition of a stake prior to the tender o⁄er (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986b),
or ￿nancing the takeover with debt (Mueller and Panunzi, 2004). Notwithstanding such devices, it
still holds true that the free-riding behavior precludes bidders from earning a pro￿t on the shares
purchased in the tender o⁄er. Hence, the pro￿t prospects of would-be acquirers remain limited and
too few takeovers are undertaken, as posited by Grossman and Hart (1980a).
While bidder gains promote takeovers, they do not ensure an e¢ cient control allocation. In
particular, dispersed shareholders may also fail to reject a value-decreasing bid (Bebchuk, 1985,
1988). Suppose that the bidder generates private bene￿ts ZB but overall decreases value (nxB +
11Strictly speaking, this requires an in￿nite number of shareholders (n = 1). To ease the exposition, we abstract
from such technical details.
10ZB < nxI). If the bidder o⁄ers a price p > xB, shareholders face the so-called pressure-to-tender
problem: A shareholder who believes the bid to succeed prefers to sell at the price p to avoid being
in the less favorable minority position with security bene￿ts xB. If she believes the bid to fail, the
choice is again irrelevant. Thus, tendering can be individually rational for a shareholder, and the
bidder can pro￿t from such a bid provided that ZB > K.
In the standard free-rider setting, the security-voting structure does not matter for the takeover
outcome or shareholder wealth. This holds equally true for value-increasing and value-decreasing
bids. Suppose that there are nv < n voting shares and the bidder makes an o⁄er for these shares
only. As before, she must o⁄er p = xB to induce voting shareholders to tender, and hence she
makes no pro￿t on the voting shares. In fact, it is immaterial how many shares the bidder must
buy to gain control. Likewise, shareholders are indi⁄erent between voting and non-voting shares,
as they receive xB in either case.
This irrelevance result hinges on three assumptions. First, shareholders know at the time of the
bid the post-takeover security bene￿ts. Second, the security and private bene￿ts depend on (the
identity of) the bidder but not on her ￿nal (cash ￿ ow) stake. Third, each shareholder presumes
that her decision does not a⁄ect the takeover outcome, i.e., is not pivotal.
Asymmetric Information Even when bidders have superior information about their ability
to generate security bene￿ts, they cannot purchase shares in the tender o⁄er at a price below the
average post-takeover security bene￿ts. Target shareholders retain their shares unless the o⁄er price
at least matches the expected post-takeover security bene￿ts (^ xB). Thus, the free-rider problem
remains under asymmetric information (Hirshleifer, 1995).
At et al. (2007) show that the security-voting structure a⁄ects the takeover outcome in this
setting precisely because p = xB does not hold for each individual bidder type. Instead, the
bid price is fair (p = ^ xB), but some types pay more and others less than their respective post-
takeover security bene￿ts. More non-voting shares reduce the fraction of return rights that bidders
purchase and therefore render a bid ceteris paribus more pro￿table for types who pay more than
their post-takeover security bene￿ts. Hence, some formerly frustrated types can earn a pro￿t and
now make a bid. In response, shareholders revise their beliefs about the post-takeover share value
downward. This in turn lowers the bid price at which shareholders are willing to tender and makes
11the takeover pro￿table for further types. Thus, non-voting shares mitigate the free-rider problem
when shareholders do not know the bidder￿ s ability to generate value and private bene￿ts and
security bene￿ts are positively correlated.12 In this setting, the security-voting structure can in
fact be used to discriminate among bidders, i.e., to frustrate value-decreasing ones but encourage
value-increasing ones. Typically, this optimal structure deviates from one share - one vote, and the
optimal number of voting shares decreases with the quality of legal shareholder protection.
Endogenous Private Bene￿ts Grossman and Hart (1980a), like many subsequent takeover
models, (implicitly) assume that private bene￿ts and security bene￿ts are independent of the bid-
der￿ s ￿nal cash ￿ ow stake. To succeed, the bidder must o⁄er a price equal to the post-takeover
security bene￿ts and she undertakes the bid if her private bene￿ts are su¢ cient to cover the takeover
cost (ZB > K). The security-voting structure has no impact on the bid price or the takeover inci-
dence.
Burkart et al. (1998) show that the security-voting structure can matter because it a⁄ects the
bidder￿ s private bene￿ts. In contrast to the above framework, they assume that private bene￿t
extraction is ine¢ cient and exhibits decreasing marginal returns. When the bidder owns more cash
￿ ow rights, she internalizes more of this ine¢ ciency and therefore extracts less private bene￿ts
which implies higher post-takeover security bene￿ts. Due to the free-rider behavior, the bidder
does not make any pro￿t on the tendered shares, and the private bene￿ts constitute her only pro￿t.
Since non-voting shares reduce the number of cash ￿ ow rights that a bidder has to purchase to
gain control, more non-voting shares increase her private bene￿ts. This in turn may be necessary
to make the bid pro￿table. Thus, more private bene￿t extraction is a bene￿t rather than a cost of
dual-class structures as it promotes takeovers of dispersedly held ￿rms.
Finite Number of Shareholders With a ￿nite rather than in￿nite number of shareholders,
each individual shareholder takes into account that her decision is with positive probability pivotal
for the aggregate outcome. As a result, she is willing to tender at a price below the post-takeover
security bene￿ts (Bagnoli and Lipman, 1988; Holmstr￿m and Nalebu⁄, 1992). This ￿discount￿
and hence the bidder￿ s pro￿t increase as it becomes more likely that each individual shareholder￿ s
12These results - like others in this literature - are sensitive to the assumed relationship between security and private
bene￿ts. For instance, more voting shares promote takeover activity when security bene￿ts and private bene￿ts are
inversely related.
12decision is pivotal. A reduction in the number of voting shares therefore mitigates the free-rider
problem (Gromb, 1992). With fewer votes to be tendered, each voting shareholder feels more
pivotal and hence more inclined to sell. As a result, the bidder￿ s pro￿t and the takeover probability
increase.
Social vs. Private Optimality The above extensions of the Grossman and Hart (1980a) frame-
work all ￿nd that deviations from one share - one vote mitigate the free-rider problem in dispersedly
held ￿rms. To the extent that takeovers should be promoted, deviations may thus be socially e¢ -
cient. Similarly, regulations that compel bidders to purchase all shares, like the mandatory bid rule
or the coattail provision, replicate the one share - one vote structure and may therefore frustrate
too many value-increasing takeovers.
The socially optimal structure di⁄ers in general from the privately preferred one, because target
shareholders neither internalize takeover costs nor the bidder￿ s private bene￿ts. This divergence
is simple to illustrate: Since the free-rider condition equates the bid price to the security bene￿ts
under the bidder, shareholders want a takeover to succeed whenever xB > xI. From a social
perspective, takeovers should not succeed unless nxB + ZB ￿ K > nxI + ZI. Clearly, these two
conditions need not coincide.
This divergence undermines the common view that owners who take a ￿rm public choose the
socially optimal charter provisions because they are residual claimants and therefore fully internalize
the costs and bene￿ts of their decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The ￿ aw in the argument
is that initial negotiations cannot feasibly include all parties that contribute in the future to the
value of the ￿rm, such as the bidder in the present context. Being self-interested, owners and initial
shareholders choose the security-voting structure that maximizes their expected takeover returns,
while the socially e¢ cient rule takes the bidder￿ s cost and private bene￿ts into account.
Minority Blocks The presence of a minority blockholder who merely decides to tender or retain
her shares does not alter the takeover outcome in the framework with exogenous security and
private bene￿ts (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1980a). Even if the blockholder were known to tender
her shares, a successful bid still requires that enough small shareholders tender. Hence, the bid
price must match the post-takeover security bene￿ts as in case of the fully dispersed ownership.
A minority block matters in the single-bidder setting only if the number of tendered shares is an
13upward-sloping function of the bid price (Burkart et al., 2006). This feature obtains when target
shareholders have heterogenous reservation prices (Stulz, 1988) or when the post-takeover security
bene￿ts increase with the bidder￿ s ￿nal stake due to increasingly ine¢ cient private bene￿t extraction
(Burkart et al., 1998). In either case, the presence of an opposing minority blockholder increases
the equilibrium bid price and makes takeovers less likely. As in the absence of a minority (voting)
block, non-voting shares promote takeover activity. They reduce the fraction of cash ￿ ow rights
that a successful bidder needs to acquire. This in turn lowers the takeover costs when reservation
prices are heterogeneous or increase post-takeover private bene￿ts when extraction is endogenous.
A stake owned by the bidder prior to the tender o⁄er constitutes a source of gains, thereby
mitigating the free-rider problem (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986b; Chowdhry and Jegadeesh, 1994).
This e⁄ect aside, a toehold does not alter the previous results. In particular, to the extent that
the toehold is not su¢ cient to render the bid pro￿table under one share - one vote, deviations may
still promote takeover activity.
A.2 Bidding Contest
To analyze the role of the security-voting structure in bidding contests, we assume that an outside
bidder B competes against the incumbent I. (The rival could equally well be another outside
bidder). For simplicity, neither B nor I own an initial stake in the ￿rm, and there are no takeover
costs (K = 0). The security bene￿ts generated by I and B are xB and xI per share and their
(total) private bene￿ts are ZB and ZI. At the time of the bidding contest, these characteristics
are known to the shareholders. As before, the target ￿rm has n outstanding shares which all carry
the same security bene￿ts but only nv carry a vote.
We assume that competition is e⁄ective in the sense that the losing competitor￿ s willingness-
to-pay determines the bid price. That is, the winning bid price is larger than the security bene￿ts
generated by the winner. Otherwise, the takeover outcome would be determined by the sharehold-
ers￿tendering decision, in which case the results from the single-bidder section apply. Finally, we
assume that B generates a higher total value than I, i.e.,
nxB + ZB > nxI + ZI. (1)
14Hence, the e¢ cient outcome is that B wins the control contest. Following Grossman and Hart (1988)
and Harris and Raviv (1988), we examine which security-voting structures ensure this outcome.
Reservation Prices Given that competition is e⁄ective, the bid price exceeds by de￿nition the
winner￿ s security bene￿ts. Consequently, either party submits an o⁄er for the voting shares only,
and the winning bid will attract all nv voting shares. Anticipating this, B and I are willing to o⁄er
at most nvxB + ZB and nvxI + ZI respectively. We refer to these amounts as the competitors￿
reservation prices. The bidding outcome will be e¢ cient only if B￿ s reservation price is higher than
I￿ s:
nvxB + ZB > nvxI + ZI. (2)
It is easy to verify that B wins irrespective of nv when she has larger private bene￿ts. If B has both
higher security and higher private bene￿ts (xB > xI, ZB > ZI), she wins the contest irrespective
of nv. This also holds when B has lower security bene￿ts but higher private bene￿ts (xB < xI,
ZB > ZI). In this case, B wins when nv = 1 because ZB > ZI and wins when nv = n because she
is the more e¢ cient party (nxB + ZB > nxI + ZI). As both sides of the inequality are linear in
nv, B￿ s willingness to pay must be higher for all values of nv. Thus, the security-voting structure
is irrelevant for the outcome whenever the more e¢ cient party has also larger private bene￿ts.
In the opposite case (ZB < ZI), a dual-class structures can, however, lead to an ine¢ cient
outcome. When nv is su¢ ciently low, I may have a higher reservation price than B. By contrast,
the one share - one vote structure (nv = n) always ensures the e¢ cient outcome as condition (2)
then coincides with the e¢ ciency condition (1). Thus, one share - one vote is socially optimal
as dual-class structures bear the risk that the less e¢ cient party wins the contest (Grossman and
Hart, 1988).
Control Premium When a party values control primarily because of her private bene￿ts, she is
willing to pay a control premium per share. To see this, divide condition (2) by nv to obtain the









is prepared to pay a premium (Z=nv) in excess of her security bene￿ts. Three factors account for
the potential ine¢ ciency of dual-class structures. First, the party with the larger private bene￿ts is
15prepared to pay a higher premium (relative to her security bene￿ts). Second, the control premium
per share increases when there are fewer voting shares. For a su¢ ciently low fraction of voting
shares, the di⁄erence in the control premia may thus be larger than the di⁄erence in security
bene￿ts, and I may thus o⁄er a higher per share price than B. Third, the voting shareholders￿
tendering decision ignores the potential loss incurred by non-voting shareholders. If the non-
voting shareholders could coordinate themselves, they could negotiate the e¢ cient outcome by
compensating the voting shareholders for any foregone control premium.
Social vs. Private Optimality The analysis of the case of bidding competition leads to the
conclusion that the one share - one vote is socially optimal in the sense that it always allocates
control to the bidder with the highest overall value.13 The di⁄erence to the single bidder case arises
because the losing bidder￿ s reservation price as opposed to the free-rider condition is the relevant
constraint for the bid price.
As in the single bidder case, target shareholders may prefer a socially suboptimal structure.
As already pointed out by Grossman and Hart (1988), deviations from one share - one vote allow
shareholders to extract a higher control premium.14 To understand this, consider the case when
xB > xI and ZB > ZI. In this constellation, B always wins and pays I￿ s reservation price. For any
given dual-class structure, the value of all non-voting shares is (n ￿ nv)xB whereas the total price
paid for the voting shares is nvxI + ZI. It is easy to see that total shareholder wealth decreases
in nv as xB > xI. Shareholders gain from realizing B￿ s security bene￿ts and can do so by letting
the parties compete over fewer shares as the total bid price always includes the value of I￿ s private
bene￿ts.
When the security-voting structure is chosen before the parties￿ characteristics are known,
deviations come with the risk of ine¢ cient outcomes. That notwithstanding, Sercu and Vinaimont
(2006) show through simulations that one share - one vote almost never maximizes shareholder
wealth. That is, shareholders prefer to introduce non-voting shares.
13While this also holds true in the setting with ine¢ cient private bene￿t extraction (Burkart et al., 1998), one
share - one vote need not be socially optimal. Non-voting shares intensify competition and force the winning party
to acquire more cash ￿ ow rights, thereby reducing ine¢ cient private bene￿t extraction.
14Bergstr￿m et al. (1997) and Cornelli and Felli (2000) revisit this e⁄ect in the context of the mandatory bid rule
and the sale of a bankrupt ￿rm.
16Toeholds and Bidding Competition Pre-takeover stakes do not alter the outcome of the
bidding competition under full information. Suppose B bids pB and consider the optimal response
of I who owns a fraction ￿i < 0:5 of the voting shares. She prefers to counterbid rather than to sell
her shares at this price if nvxI ￿(1￿￿I)nvpB +ZI > ￿InvpB, or equivalently, xI +(ZI=nv) > pB.
The left-hand side of the latter inequality is precisely the amount I is willing to pay when owning
no toehold. That is, the cost reduction of not having to buy her own toehold is o⁄set by the forgone
revenues (opportunity cost) of not selling her toehold to B.
Since toeholds do not a⁄ect either bidder￿ s reservation price and the bidder with the higher
reservation price wins, toeholds do not a⁄ect the control allocation. Consequently, one share - one
vote continues to be socially optimal in the presence of toeholds. It ensures that the e¢ cient bidder
and the bidder with the highest reservation price coincide.
The actual outcome, in terms of the winning price, depends on the extensive form game, notably
whether each bidder makes a single bid or can revise her bid. If bid revisions are not precluded,
the eventual bid price extracts the winning bidder￿ s entire surplus. Anticipating that the higher
valuation bidder will counterbid until her reservation price is reached, the lower valuation bidder
has an incentive to bid more than her reservation price to raise the price at which she sells her
toehold. As a result, the entire takeover gains accrue to the tendering shareholders who therefore
have no reason to deviate from one share - one vote. The surplus extraction is achieved by the
overbidding of the losing bidder with a toehold.15
In conclusion, the theoretical literature on tender o⁄ers suggests that the optimal security-voting
structure depends on a variety of factors, notably the extent of competition and the (assumed)
correlation between the parties￿private bene￿ts and security bene￿ts. Thus, the claim that one
share - one vote ￿or any other speci￿c structure ￿is generally most conducive to an e¢ cient control
allocation of widely held ￿rms is not justi￿ed. Moreover, target shareholders￿preferred structure
diverges from the socially optimal structure. In the single bidder case, shareholders prefer other
structures because they do not internalize the bidders￿private costs and bene￿ts. In the competition
case, they favour dual-class structures to extract higher control premia.
15When the reservation prices are privately observed, the incentives to overbid may result in an ine¢ cient control
allocation (Burkart, 1995). The security-voting structure remains irrelevant, as changes in the fraction of voting
shares simply scale each bidder￿ s maximization problem, leaving the optimal bids una⁄ected.
17B Negotiated Control Transfers
The preceding analysis of the tender o⁄er process presumes an ownership structure where (at least)
the majority of votes is dispersedly held. Yet, many dual-class ￿rms have a controlling minority
shareholder. In this case, a control transfer can only take place with her consent and is therefore
best viewed as the outcome of a bilateral negotiation between incumbent and new controlling
shareholder.
Drawing on Kahan (1993) and Bebchuk (1994), we consider a ￿rm run by a controlling share-
holder I who owns a fraction ￿ > 0:5 of the voting shares. The remaining (1 ￿ ￿)nv voting shares
and the (n￿nv) non-voting shares are dispersed among small shareholders. The controlling share-
holder is approached by an outside bidder B who would like to take control. We assume that both
parties￿know each others￿reservation prices, i.e., the parameters xB, xI, ZB and ZI are known.
Hence, I and B will agree on a control transfers if it is mutually bene￿cial. As it turns out, this
situation is very similar to the bidding competition between B and I, and the party that values
control more highly will eventually gain (keep) it.
A control transfer is e¢ cient if nxB + ZB > nxI + ZI, i.e., condition (1) holds. The value of
the controlling block to I is ￿nvxI + ZI, while B values the block with ￿nvxB + ZB. Abstracting
from takeover costs, the two parties ￿nd it mutually bene￿cial to trade if B￿ s reservation price is
higher than that of I:
￿nvxB + ZB > ￿nvxI + ZI. (3)
How controlling shareholder and bidder share this surplus determines the block price. Since the
subsequent arguments do not depend on a speci￿c block price, we abstract from its determination.16
Once in control, the bidder has the option to purchase the remaining voting and non-voting shares.
Due to the free-rider behavior, the small shareholders are not willing to tender their share for
less than the security bene￿ts xB. Hence, the bidder would not make a pro￿t and abstains from
purchasing the remaining shares.
Condition (3) is almost identical to condition (2), the di⁄erence being that the control sale
involves only the fraction ￿ of voting shares. But this di⁄erence matters. While one share - one
16In the theoretical literature, the block price is typically the outcome of a bargaining game between incumbent
and bidder that depends on the parties￿outside options (see e.g., Burkart et al., 2000)
18vote ensured an e¢ cient takeover outcome in the competition case, this is no longer true in a control
sale. Even though the corporate charter endows all shares with a vote, the presence of a control
block turns all minority shares into de facto non-voting shares.
Ine¢ cient Control Allocation Controlling blocks may ultimately not be owned by the more
e¢ cient party for the same reason as dual-class share structures can lead to an ine¢ cient bidding
outcome. Suppose that B generates more value but enjoys relatively small private bene￿ts. If ￿nv
is su¢ ciently small, B￿ s reservation price may be lower than that of I. The reason is that I attaches
a high control value to each share when she owns few. Consequently, she demands a price that B
may not be willing to pay, and a value-increasing control transfer may fail.
As in the competition case, the roles can be reversed. Suppose that B generates less value
but enjoys larger private bene￿ts. Now B￿ s reservation price may exceed I￿ s if ￿nv is su¢ ciently
small. Thus, a value-decreasing control transfer may occur because B is willing to pay I a very
high control premium.
These ine¢ ciencies arise because I and B do not internalize the e⁄ect of the control transfer
on the minority shareholders, just as the voting shareholders ignored the welfare of the non-voting
shareholders in the bidding contest. Again, the ine¢ ciencies could be avoided if the minority
shareholders were able to coordinate and compensate I or B for taking the e¢ cient decision.
As in the competition case, an ine¢ cient outcome is more likely to materialize when the fraction
of voting shares is smaller. Increasing the number of shares that the controlling shareholder must
hold reduces the control premium per share and thus the potential divergence between the ranking
of reservation prices and the ranking of total ￿rm values. That is, one share - one vote leads to the
second-best control allocation, minimizing both the failure of value-increasing bids and the success
of value-decreasing bids.
Social vs. Private Optimality Zingales (1995a) shows that ￿ oating some shares through an
initial public o⁄ering (IPO) can increase the total proceeds from a control sale. By selling shares to
dispersed investors who have no choice but to ￿free-ride￿in the subsequent control sale, the owner
can extract part of the surplus, without having to bargain over it.17 Dual-class shares allow to ￿ oat
17If the market for controlling blocks would be equally competitive as the market for cash ￿ ow rights, the two-stage
sale procedure would not increase the owner￿ s total proceeds.
19more shares (cash ￿ ow rights), while maintaining control. Moreover, the control premium (per
share) increases, as fewer shares are involved in the control sale. Thus, dual-class share structures
help to extract more surplus from the bidder, for essentially the same reason as in the competition
case. The owner may therefore reduce the number of voting shares even if this increases the risk
of an ine¢ cient control allocation (Bebchuk and Zingales, 2000). However, it should be noted
that deviations that increase the expected proceeds of ￿rm founders may encourage entrepreneurial
activity.
Mandatory bid rules and coattail provisions, which force the bidder to extend the same o⁄er
to controlling and minority shareholders, have an ambiguous e⁄ect on the e¢ ciency of control
sales (Kahan, 1993; Bebchuk, 1994). As the controlling shareholder does not sell unless she is
paid a control premium, these provisions force the bidder to pay that premium on all shares. The
redistribution from bidder to small shareholders increases the cost of a control transfer, thereby
reducing takeover activity and entrenching existing control structures. This is a mixed blessing:
While it prevents all value-decreasing bids, it also deters more value-increasing bids. This deterrence
e⁄ect is more pronounced for dual-class structures because the control premium per share tends to
be higher.
IV Ownership Concentration and Security-Voting Structure
Control transfer models typically take the ￿rm￿ s assets as given and examines how the distribution
of cash ￿ ow and voting rights a⁄ects the allocation of control over these assets. Another comple-
mentary strand of the literature takes the identity of the party in control as given and explores how
its decisions are in￿ uenced by the distribution of cash ￿ ow and voting rights. A ￿rm￿ s ownership
and control structure in￿ uences the corporate decisions such as investment or dividend policies
through two distinct channels. On the one hand, the ownership structure determines the extent to
which shareholders actively participate in corporate decision-making. We review these direct e⁄ects
in this section. On the other hand, the ownership and control structure a⁄ects the extent to which
control is contestable, which in turn has repercussions for a broad range of corporate decisions. We
discuss these indirect or ex ante e⁄ects of the takeover threat in the next section (section V).
Many ￿rms are characterized by the separation of ownership and control (Berle and Means,
201933): Shareholders delegate decision-making authority to managers to run the ￿rm on their behalf.
As a result, the manager may choose actions that increase her private bene￿ts at the expense of
the shareholders￿ security bene￿ts. The shareholders can limit divergences from their interest
by providing appropriate incentives or by monitoring the manager￿ s actions. To use the latter
mechanism, shareholders must reserve the right to overrule managerial decisions whenever they
disagree and want to take action. This formal authority is embodied in the voting rights.
Yet, formal authority confers real authority, i.e., an e⁄ective control over decisions, only if it
is duly exercised (Aghion and Tirole, 1997). However, shareholders tend to refrain from doing so
unless they possess the relevant information. Small shareholders, in particular, lack the incentives
to collect information and oversee managers. Abstracting from the possibility of a takeover, the
allocation of votes among dispersed shareholders is therefore immaterial.
By contrast, an investor owning a substantial fraction of cash ￿ ow rights has an incentive to
incur the monitoring costs to constrain the manager￿ s discretion, thereby mitigating the agency
problem. Indeed, concentrated ownership has been advocated as a simple governance mechanism
to promote value maximization by ￿rms either through monitoring or through the alignment of
interests.
A Outside Blockholder and Monitoring
From the other shareholders￿perspective, the presence of an active blockholder may or may not
be bene￿cial (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). On the one hand, the outside blockholder can use her
in￿ uence to increase security bene￿ts, thereby acting in the interest of all shareholders. On the
other hand, she may choose to collude with the manager to divert corporate resources and share the
private bene￿ts.18 In this case, she becomes de facto an inside blockholder whose role we examine
in the next section. Here we assume that the blockholder is an outsider whose interests are perfectly
aligned with those of the other shareholders.
Models of shareholder monitoring typically abstract from the role of voting rights and assume
that the blockholder has the ability or power to correct managerial decisions.19 This assumption
18Both sides of ownership concentration are well documented in numerous empirical studies, but the evidence is
inconclusive on whether the positive or negative e⁄ects dominate (Becht et al., 2003; Bergl￿f and Burkart, 2003.)
19A notable exception is Shleifer and Vishny (1986b) where an incumbent blockholder after collecting information
must acquire the majority of votes either through a takeover or a proxy contest to implement the intended changes.
21is a simpli￿cation which ￿ts the logic of the framework: Given that shareholders have congruent
interests, small shareholders can only gain from letting the blockholder monitor and interfere on
their behalf.
There are, however, various reasons why the blockholder￿ s degree of in￿ uence depends on both
cash ￿ ow rights and votes. For instance, a blockholder￿ s proposal may need to be backed by
su¢ ciently many votes, say a simple majority, forcing her to mobilize extra support if she owns
too few herself (Bennedsen and Nielsen, 2006). Similarly, owning more voting rights can improve
the odds of a favorable outcome in a shareholder vote when small shareholders vote erratically or
nurture a status quo bias in favor of management (Rydqvist, 1992).
Given that votes have a distinct impact on the blockholder￿ s ability to challenge managerial
decisions, leveraging voting power is advantageous if ownership of large equity stakes entails (op-
portunity) costs. For instance, holding a substantial fraction of one ￿rm￿ s cash ￿ ow rights is costly
for a risk-averse investor (Admati et al., 1994; Hagelin et al., 2006). To reduce ￿rm-speci￿c risk,
the blockholder may even make the ￿rm engage in value-reducing hedging activities or forgo risky
but pro￿table investment projects (Hu, 1990). Larger stakes also reduce liquidity in the secondary
market, thereby making it more di¢ cult to sell shares when in sudden need of cash. Furthermore,
investors may simply not be su¢ ciently wealthy to purchase or own substantial blocks in large
corporations.
Under the one share - one vote structure, these costs do not only constrain the size of the equity
stake but also the voting power. To the extent that more monitoring is desirable, it is optimal to let
the blockholder own more votes than cash ￿ ow rights. A dual-class structure may also be desirable
when too much monitoring frustrates valuable managerial initiative (Burkart et al., 1997). In that
case, a wedge between votes and cash ￿ ow rights may simultaneously reduce the cost of interference
and the level of monitoring.
A Simple Illustration Consider a managerial ￿rm with a single outside blockholder L, who
holds a fraction s 2 [0;1] of the voting rights and a fraction d 2 [0;1] of the cash ￿ ow rights. Being
risk-averse, L incurs a cost k(d) of holding a non-diversi￿ed portfolio with kd > 0 and kdd > 0.20
20Throughout the article, we use the following short-hand notation. If f is a function, fx denotes the ￿rst-order
derivative of that function with respect to x, fxx the second-order derivative with respect to x, and fxy the cross-
derivative with respect to x and y.
22The manager generates a total value of V > 0, and can divert up to an amount Z < V (without
having to fear legal prosecution), unless L interferes.
To reverse the managerial decision L has to incur some ￿xed cost of interference, c. In addition,
she needs to mobilize the support of other shareholders, unless she holds a majority of the votes.
More speci￿cally, the total cost of reversing a decision is c(s) with cs < 0 for all s < 0:5 and
c(s) = c for all s > 0:5. That is, interference is cheaper when L owns more votes, and once she
holds a majority of the votes she only bears the ￿xed cost c. Furthermore, 2c < Z, and the diverted
amount is fully recovered if L interferes.
Since the manager never loses from diversion, her (weakly) dominant strategy is to divert
the amount Z. For given values of s and d, L thus interferes when her gain exceeds the cost
of interference, i.e., dZ > c(s). Clearly, she is more likely to reverse managerial private bene￿t
extraction when she receives a larger share d of the gains from interference (alignment e⁄ect), or
when she owns more votes s, thereby lowering her cost of interference (power e⁄ect).
Leveraging L￿ s voting power simultaneously reduces interference and underdiversi￿cation costs.
Thus, the optimal structure allocates to L a majority of the votes (s￿ > 0:5) to maximize her ability
to monitor and an equity stake su¢ cient to preserve her incentive to interfere, i.e., d￿ = c=Z. Since
2c < Z by assumption, d￿ < 0:5. That is, it is cost-e¢ cient for L to own fewer cash ￿ ow rights
than voting rights.
Under one share - one vote (s = d), a reduction in the interference cost necessarily goes together
with higher costs of underdiversi￿cation, and vice versa. As a result, L either diversi￿es her wealth
less or monitors the manager less.
B Inside Blockholder and Extraction
As small shareholders abstain from monitoring, an inside blockholder in an otherwise dispersedly
held ￿rm enjoys considerable autonomy. Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that the insider and the
small shareholders have diverging interests. Assuming that the value of the ￿rm depends on costly
managerial actions, the insider underprovides such e⁄ort relative to the ￿rst-best level, because she
bears all the e⁄ort cost but receives only part of the returns (security bene￿ts). A larger equity
stake increases her incentives to exert e⁄ort, thereby aligning her interests (more) with those of
the other shareholders. Crucial for this result is the assumption of decreasing marginal returns to
23e⁄ort, which is to say that it becomes increasingly di¢ cult to create more value. Unless the ￿rm
is fully owned by the insider, the ￿rst-best e⁄ort level is not chosen. The underprovision of e⁄ort
constitutes (one manifestation of) the agency cost of outside ￿nance.
The e⁄ort provision problem can be rephrased as a problem of private bene￿t extraction, where
the insider can convert security bene￿ts into private bene￿ts but in the process dissipates some
of the value (Burkart et al., 1998). In this setting, a larger equity stake forces the insider to
internalize a greater part of the loss, thereby inducing her to extract less private bene￿ts. The
crucial assumption is that the marginal deadweight loss increases in the level of extraction. That
is, it becomes increasingly ine¢ cient to extract more private bene￿ts.21 Again, outside ￿nance
creates agency costs, as some ine¢ cient extraction always occurs unless the insider owns the whole
￿rm.
The alignment e⁄ect operates solely through the insider￿ s cash ￿ ow rights, while the vote al-
location does not matter as long as the remaining shares are dispersed. As in the case of the
outside blockholder, the irrelevance of the voting rights allocation relies on the assumption that
other shareholders remain passive. A role for votes emerges when corporate decisions that bene￿t
primarily the insider require shareholder approval. In this case, the inside blockholder may need
to bribe a su¢ cient number of minority shareholders to support her, thereby e⁄ectively having to
share some of her private bene￿ts. As a consequence, her incentive to divert resources may decrease
in the amount of support she has to procure.22
A Simple Illustration Consider a ￿rm of value V that has a single inside blockholder I, who
holds a fraction s 2 [0;1] of the voting rights and a fraction d 2 [0;1] of the cash ￿ ow rights. As
before, there is some action that requires majority support, forcing I to persuade other shareholders
when she is short of votes. In addition, I can and must bribe them to vote for an action that is
against their own interest.
More speci￿cally, I seeks shareholder approval for an action that is necessary to extract private
bene￿ts. To gain shareholder approval, I needs to "buy" maxf0;0:5 ￿ sg votes by giving up a
share 1 ￿ ￿(s) of the private bene￿ts to the supporting small shareholders. Thus, ￿(s) 2 [0;1]
21Otherwise, the inside blockholder extracts either nothing or all she can without being legally prosecuted. The
former (latter) obtains if her equity stake is larger (smaller) than the constant marginal deadweight loss.
22Similar arguments have been put forward in the context of multiple blockholders (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon,
2000; Nagar et al., 2004).
24denotes the fraction of the private bene￿ts that I retains, where ￿s > 0 for s < 0:5 and ￿(s) = 1
for s > 0:5. Accordingly, I keeps a larger fraction of the private bene￿ts to herself when she owns
more votes, because it requires a smaller bribe to ensure outside support. When she owns the
majority of votes, she keeps the entire private bene￿ts, as no bribes are needed.
If I gains support, she can choose an amount z 2 [0;Z] that she wants to divert, where Z < V .
Following the previous discussion, we assume that private bene￿t extraction is ine¢ cient. More
speci￿cally, the diverted resources are transformed into private bene￿ts of value ￿(z), where ￿z > 0,
￿zz < 0, ￿z (0) = 1 and ￿z (Z) = 0.
Given I has support for the action, she chooses z to maximize ￿(s)￿(z) + d(V ￿ z). Because
￿(z) is concave in z, the solution is given by the ￿rst-order condition
￿z (z) = d=￿(s). (4)
Due to the ine¢ cient extraction technology, I￿ s preferred extraction level decreases in her share
of cash ￿ ow rights (alignment e⁄ect), while it increases in her share of voting rights as long as
s < 0:5 (power e⁄ect). The latter e⁄ect stems from the fact that she must buy fewer votes, thereby
retaining a larger share ￿(s) of the private bene￿ts.
Thus, dual-class shares, notably controlling minority shareholder structures, exacerbate agency
con￿ icts among shareholders as they simultaneously increase the incentives and the ability of the
inside blockholder to extract private bene￿ts. By contrast, one share - one vote either strengthens
the alignment e⁄ect if I holds a large(r) equity stake or weakens her ability to extract private
bene￿ts if she owns a small(er) block. In either case, the level of extraction decreases.
Bennedsen and Nielsen (2006) combine the preceding insights in a single framework in which
votes have a distinct impact on the e¢ cacy of monitoring and extraction. Leveraging a block-
holder￿ s voting power entails a trade-o⁄: It makes her a more e⁄ective monitor of management, but
it also enables her to extract more private bene￿ts. In the above examples, an increase in s reduces
the cost c(s) of overruling the management but increases the share ￿(s) of private bene￿ts accruing
to the blockholder. Or putting it more generally, empowering the blockholder mitigates the agency
con￿ ict between managers and shareholders while aggravating the con￿ ict between large and small
shareholders. Hence, the e⁄ect of a mandatory one share - one vote rule that disempowers block-
25owners is ambiguous: Although it protects small shareholders against private bene￿t extraction by
the large shareholder, it leaves the manager with more discretion and hence the ability to extract
(more) private bene￿ts.
V Contestable Control and Security-Voting Structure
Decisions and actions of corporate insiders are often not challenged by existing shareholders, in
particular when their stakes are small. Another potentially e⁄ective constraint on the insiders￿
behavior is the market for corporate control (Manne, 1965). Apart from facilitating actual control
changes, the mere possibility of a takeover can have a disciplinary e⁄ect (Grossman and Hart, 1980b;
Scharfstein, 1988). The fear of being ousted after a takeover may induce insiders to abstain from
self-serving actions that lower ￿rm value. As the security-voting structure in￿ uences the extent
to which control is contestable, it also matters for decisions taken in anticipation of a (hostile)
takeover threat. In addition, (regulatory) restrictions on the security-voting structure limit the
insiders￿ability to preserve control which in turn may a⁄ect the choice of ownership structure and
the decision to go public. In what follows, we examine the e⁄ects that the security-voting structure
has through its impact on control contestability.
A Alignment and Control Contestability
Control contestability and partial ownership concentration are alternative mechanisms to mitigate
the con￿ ict between insiders and (outside) shareholders. It thus seems ideal to discipline insiders
by using both mechanisms. But to the extent that votes are tied to cash ￿ ow rights, the two are
inversely related: More shares give the insider more cash ￿ ow rights (more alignment) but also
more votes (more entrenchment). For instance, under the one share - one vote structure, every
increase in cash ￿ ow rights is matched by a proportional increase in voting rights.23
Separating votes from cash ￿ ow rights changes the interplay between the two mechanisms. If the
insider holds more votes than cash ￿ ow rights she undermines both mechanisms, thereby increasing
her incentives to engage in self-dealings. That is, leveraging the insider￿ s voting power aggravates
23The two con￿ icting e⁄ects can imply a non-monotonic relationship between inside ownership and share value (e.g.,
Morck et al., 1988). For instance, the alignment e⁄ect may initially dominate, but above some level the entrenchment
e⁄ect may prevail (e.g., Stulz, 1988). The shape of the relationship is an empirical question about which there is yet
no consensus in the literature (Adams and Ferreira, 2007).
26the agency con￿ ict because she is better protected from a takeover and is less aligned with the
other shareholders (Bebchuk et al., 2000; Claessens et al., 2002; Gompers et al., 2006; Masulis et
al., 2007). As the subsequent example illustrates, the vote allocation could in principle also be used
to achieve the opposite, i.e., to strengthen the two mechanisms.
A Simple Illustration Consider the previous example with a ￿rm of value V and a single inside
blockholder I, who holds a fraction s 2 [0;1] of the voting rights and a fraction d 2 [0;1] of the cash
￿ ow rights. As before, I can divert an amount z 2 [0;Z] of corporate resources and transform them
into private bene￿ts of value ￿(z), where ￿z > 0, ￿zz < 0, ￿z (0) = 1 and ￿z (Z) = 0. We replace
the previously required shareholder approval with the possibility of a takeover, in which case I sells
her block at an exogenously given price P, and foregoes her entire private bene￿ts. The probability
of a takeover depends on I￿ s voting power s, and is denoted by 1 ￿ ￿(s) with ￿(s) 2 [0;1], ￿s > 0
for s < 0:5, and ￿(s) = 1 for s > 0:5. That is, I can block takeovers more easily when she owns
more votes, and is insulated from the takeover threat when she owns a majority of the votes.
For given s and d, I￿ s optimal extraction decision maximizes ￿(s)[￿(z) + d(V ￿ z)]+[1 ￿ ￿(s)]P.
The ￿rst term re￿ ects her payo⁄ from remaining in control, whereas the second term represents
her return in case of a takeover. As ￿(z) is concave in z, the solution is given by the ￿rst-order
condition
￿z (z) = d=￿(s). (5)
This condition coincides with condition (4), except that ￿(s) replaces ￿(s). As before, extraction
decreases in I￿ s share of cash ￿ ow rights (alignment e⁄ect), while it increases in her voting power,
as long as s < 0:5 (entrenchment e⁄ect). When I owns more votes, the takeover becomes less likely,
thereby increasing the probability ￿(s) that she actually bene￿ts from the extraction.
As the level of extraction increases in the di⁄erence (s ￿ d), one share - one vote indeed protects
minority shareholders. A zero wedge entails less private bene￿t extraction which in turn translates
into higher security bene￿ts. However, this is not the e¢ cient solution. Even better is to let
the di⁄erence (s ￿ d) assume a negative value. That is, extraction is lowest under an insider or
manager who owns a large block of only non-voting shares, thereby being strongly aligned and
easily contestable.
27Contrary to the above argument, insiders who hold a substantial ￿nancial interest but no (or
less) votes do not seem prevalent. Instead, ￿rms are either run by insiders who hold large equity
stakes and are largely insulated from hostile takeovers, or widely held and run by professional
managers, who are much more vulnerable to hostile takeovers but also less aligned. In spite of
stock option plans and the like, compensation packages for top executives typically dwindle in
comparison to the equity stakes of most large owners. Moreover, controlling shareholders often
own non-voting shares (Bergstr￿m and Rydqvist, 1990), which is di¢ cult to reconcile with the
view that dual-class shares are purely a vehicle to extract maximum private bene￿ts at the expense
of minority shareholders.
Given these alternatives in practice, the relevant question seems to be whether ￿rms are more
e¢ ciently run by contestable professional managers, who can be ￿red, or large entrenched owners,
who are more aligned. The fact that recent corporate governance scandals occurred both in dis-
persedly held ￿rms (e.g., Enron) as well as in ￿rms with dominant owners (e.g., Parmalat) indicates
that this question has no obvious answer.
B Bene￿ts of Entrenchment
The preceding section emphasizes the disciplinary e⁄ect of the takeover threat. However, control
contestability comes with costs as well as bene￿ts, and its overall impact is much debated in
the literature. On the one hand, actual takeovers may destroy or redistribute rather than create
value. Like other governance mechanisms, they are not free of agency problems, and can be a
manifestation as much as a cure of agency problems. For instance, takeovers may be driven by
managerial overcon￿dence (Roll, 1986; Malmendier and Tate, 2004) or empire-building motives
(Jensen, 1986), rather than by value improvements.
On the other hand, the mere threat of a takeover may distort insiders￿behavior rather than
induce them to promote pro￿t-maximizing actions. First, if takeovers are undertaken for reasons
other than reversing ine¢ cient or self-serving behavior, acting in the shareholders￿best interest
need not be an e⁄ective protection against a takeover. Second, insiders who are exposed to a
substantial takeover threat may waste e⁄ort on measures to protect themselves. Apart from poison
pills, stock repurchases or litigation to fend o⁄ hostile takeovers, they may pursue more opaque
strategies, like undertaking skill-speci￿c investments to become less easily replaceable (Shleifer and
28Vishny, 1989) or awarding workers generous long-term contracts, thereby making takeovers less
attractive (Pagano and Volpin, 2005).
Third, the takeover threat may discourage investments in ￿rm-speci￿c human capital which
may become redundant after a control change (Knoeber, 1986; Ippolito, 2006). More generally, if
takeovers imply some form of contract renegotiation ("breach of trust"), the ￿rm￿ s stakeholders are
reluctant to tie their fate to the ￿rm and prefer to develop more general skills that increase their
value in the external labor market (Shleifer and Summers, 1988).
Finally, the takeover pressure may induce insiders to behave myopically and sacri￿ce long-term
pro￿tability to boost short-term earnings (Stein, 1988; Chemmanur and Jiao, 2006). For instance,
a takeover threat may hinder ￿rms from pursuing long-term R&D strategies.
The common theme of the above arguments is that some protection from takeovers may preserve
or promote insiders￿incentives to increase ￿rm value. Thus, control contestability can have both
negative and positive e⁄ects on corporate decisions, as the following example illustrates.
A Simple Illustration Consider a ￿rm that is managed by an insider I who, for simplicity,
owns no cash ￿ ow rights and only enjoys private bene￿ts. The total ￿rm value V (e) is now an
increasing function of the I￿ s e⁄ort e, and the marginal returns to e⁄ort are decreasing (Ve > 0
and Vee < 0). If I remains in control, she can extract a fraction ￿ of the total ￿rm value as private
bene￿ts. In contrast to before, private bene￿t extraction does not dissipate any value. Thus, I
generates security bene￿ts XI = (1 ￿ ￿)V (e) and private bene￿ts of ZI = ￿V (e).24
If the ￿rm is taken over, I is ousted and loses all her private bene￿ts. The takeover probability
￿(s;V ) decreases (weakly) in I￿ s voting power s and total ￿rm value V (e) (￿s 6 0 and ￿V 6 0).
Given the above assumptions, I chooses e⁄ort e to maximize her expected pay-o⁄
￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)ZI ￿ e = (1 ￿ ￿)￿V (e) ￿ e,
24This simpli￿es the argument but ignores that I may extract more when she owns less cash ￿ ow rights. Given
the example already abstracts from the alignment e⁄ect, setting I￿ s equity stake equal to zero (d = 0) imposes no
meaningful further restriction. While the absence of an alignment e⁄ect biases the result in favor of deviations from
one share - one vote, it isolates the trade-o⁄ between the disciplinary and the initiative e⁄ect of the takeover threat.
29and the ￿rst-order condition is given by
(1 ￿ ￿)￿Ve ￿ ￿V V ￿Ve = 1.
The left-hand side comprises the marginal returns to e⁄ort. The ￿rst term captures the idea that I
exerts more e⁄ort when she is more likely to retain control, i.e., when (1 ￿ ￿) is large. We refer to
this as the initiative e⁄ect. The second term measures how e⁄ective e⁄ort is as a takeover deterrent
or, more precisely, how much this e⁄ect is worth to I. We refer to this as the disciplinary e⁄ect.
For the further analysis, it proves convenient to rewrite the ￿rst-order condition as
1 ￿ (￿ + ￿V V ) = 1=￿Ve. (6)
As the right-hand side increases in e⁄ort due to Vee < 0, the e⁄ort level that satis￿es this equation
must increase when the left-hand side is larger.
As a benchmark, consider ￿rst the case in which I holds a majority of the votes (s > 0:5) and is
therefore immune to the takeover threat. In this case, the takeover probability is zero (￿ = ￿V = 0),
and the ￿rst-order condition simpli￿es to ￿Ve = 1. Whether a di⁄erent vote allocation that allows
for a takeover (s < 0:5) induces more e⁄ort depends on the sign of (￿ + ￿V V ). If ￿ > j￿V V j,
a controlling insider exerts more e⁄ort than an insider who must fear a hostile bid. That is,
the initiative e⁄ect dominates the disciplinary e⁄ect, and minimizing contestability provides the
strongest incentives to create value. By contrast, if ￿ < j￿V V j the takeover threat disciplines the
insider, i.e., induces him to work harder.
To analyze the question further, we assume partial contestability (s < 0:5) and taking the
partial derivative of the left-hand side of (6) with respect to s yields
@
@s
(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿V V ) = ￿(￿s + ￿V sV ).
When this expression is positive, i.e., (￿s + ￿V sV ) is negative, the left-hand side of (6) increases in
s. This in turn implies that more voting power induces the insider to exert more e⁄ort.
Simple inspection reveals the two aforementioned e⁄ects. The ￿rst term ￿s is always negative
and captures that the insider￿ s initiative increases in s as it becomes more likely that she retains
30control. The second term ￿V sV is also negative if ￿V s < 0. The latter condition implies that the
extent to which a further increase in ￿rm value reduces the takeover probability increases in s. If
this holds, more voting power also provides stronger incentives to fend o⁄ a takeover by increasing
￿rm value. As a result, less insider votes unambiguously reduce e⁄ort. By contrast, if ￿V s > 0,
frustrating takeovers by increasing the ￿rm value becomes more e⁄ective when the insider has less
voting power. In this case, a genuine trade-o⁄ between initiative and discipline emerges.
C Choice of Ownership
Tying votes to cash ￿ ow rights increases the amount of equity capital required for owning a given
share of voting rights. As a result, a corporate insider must retain more cash ￿ ow rights to control
a ￿rm, or equivalently, must relinquish more control when selling cash ￿ ow rights to outsiders.
Paradoxically, this means that one share - one vote can both discourage and promote ownership
concentration. In the ￿rst case, large owners relinquish control because it is too expensive; in the
second case, they are reluctant to ￿ oat shares for fear of losing control.
The very existence of a controlling shareholder implies that her opportunity costs of holding a
non-diversi￿ed portfolio do not exceed her private bene￿ts, or more precisely the sum of private
bene￿ts and (potential) value improvement of her equity stake due to her presence. Relative to
a dual-class structure, one share - one vote increases the cost of holding a controlling position.
Consequently, a controlling minority blockholder may respond to the introduction of a one share -
one vote rule in two ways. She may reduce her voting power rather than to acquire more cash ￿ ow
rights, because her overall bene￿ts are insu¢ cient to cover the additional costs. The loss in voting
power raises the takeover probability, which in turn reduces her expected private bene￿ts and hence
reinforces her incentives to dissolve the block.25 The resulting ownership deconcentration, while
mitigating the con￿ ict among shareholders, is bound to leave more discretion to the manager.
Alternatively, the value of her private bene￿ts may induce the blockholder to retain her con-
trolling position despite one share - one vote. In this case, the incumbent blockholder is reluctant
to ￿ oat shares lest the large private bene￿ts will attract outside bidders, forcing her either to sur-
render control or to repurchase the ￿ oated shares at a control premium (Bebchuk, 1999). When
dispersed ownership is, in this sense, inherently unstable, one share - one vote makes inevitable con-
25In a study of voluntary (as opposed to mandatory) share class uni￿cations, Pajuste (2005) ￿nds that the con-
trolling minority shareholder afterwards owned less than 10 percent of the stock in 20 out of 71 cases.
31trolling shareholder structures (socially) more costly by e.g., constraining the incumbent￿ s wealth
diversi￿cation.26 Moreover, if a ￿rm depends on outside equity but can only raise funds by issuing
voting shares which dilute the incumbent￿ s control, the latter may prefer to forgo valuable invest-
ments (Attari and Banerjee, 2004; Banerjee, 2005; Kihlstrom and Wachter, 2005). By contrast, a
dual-class structure would enable her both to shed risk and to raise new equity without compromis-
ing control. Accordingly, restricting the security-voting structure to break-up controlling minority
shareholder structures may not achieve its objective but instead limit risk-sharing, market liquidity
or ￿rm growth. Conversely, direct measures to reduce private bene￿ts may endogenously lead to
less ownership concentration and fewer deviations from one share - one vote.
Entrepreneurs who value control (bene￿ts) may tap into the equity market only if they are
granted some safeguard against takeovers or if they can choose an ownership structure which
guarantees little interference by outside investors (Pagano and R￿ell, 1998). Accordingly, they will
be reluctant to go public when public capital markets stipulate strict corporate governance rules
that impede their autonomy (Boot et al., 2006). Instead, they may prefer to enter private contracts
which do not impose listing and disclosure costs or migrate to markets with more lax regulations.27
Whether stricter regulations merely push undesirable ￿rms out of the market or lead sound ￿rms
to resort to inferior means of ￿nancing is an open question that is also raised in the context of other
corporate governance rules, e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Zingales, 2006).
The last point suggests that a mandatory one share - one vote rule decreases the number of ￿rms
going public. This seems at odds with the empirical regularity that better minority shareholder
protection is associated with larger public markets (La Porta et al., 2000). Yet, this need not be
a contradiction since dual-class structures, like large owners, may be a consequence rather than a
determinant of poor governance institutions. In contrast, the above argument is a ceteris paribus
statement: For an otherwise given institutional environment, imposing one share - one vote reduces
entrepreneurs￿incentives to raise outside equity, as they value control. Consistent with this view,
many US ￿rms adopt anti-takeover provisions, including dual-class shares, when going public (Field
and Karpo⁄, 2002).
26Bodnaruk et al. (2005) provide evidence that diversi￿cation gains are an important rationale for going public.
27For instance, it is sometimes claimed that successful dual-class ￿rms, like Warren Bu⁄et￿ s Berkshire-Hathaway
Inc. or Google Inc., may have remained private without a grip on control.
32VI Lock-In Mechanisms
So far, the analysis has focused on cash ￿ ow and vote allocations that can be implemented or repli-
cated with a dual-class share structure. Other mechanisms to allocate voting power disproportion-
ately among shareholders are voting and ownership ceilings, priority shares, depositary certi￿cates
and double voting shares. These devices that we discuss in turn primarily serve to lock-in control.
Ownership and Voting Restrictions Voting rights ceilings limit the number of votes that a
shareholder can cast irrespective of the number of voting shares she owns. That is, all shares held
in excess of the ceiling lose their votes, which can drive a wedge between the cash ￿ ow rights and
the voting rights of a blockholder. Ownership ceilings prohibit shareholders to own more shares
than a certain threshold. Although ownership ceilings are strictly speaking not deviations from
the proportionality principle, they prevent individual shareholders from accumulating a substantial
stake and voting power, thereby limiting the ability to in￿ uence corporate decisions.
In contrast to di⁄erential voting shares, voting and ownership ceilings are primarily introduced
to dilute rather than leverage shareholders￿ability to concentrate control. That is, they hinder the
emergence and in￿ uence of large shareholders, thereby making takeovers virtually impossible. At
the same time, they fragment power and impede e⁄ective monitoring of the management. Voting
ceilings have been justi￿ed on grounds that they protect minority shareholders from parties who
seek to gain control with the purpose of looting the ￿rm (Franks and Mayer, 1998a). However,
they leave shareholders at the benevolence of managers who are largely insulated from blockholder
interference and takeovers (Goergen et al., 2005). That is, they simultaneously undermine the two
major mechanisms for disciplining managers: outside monitoring and control contestability.
As voting ceilings can be removed by shareholder vote, they are not an absolute safeguard
against takeovers.28 Moreover, voting on a removal is similar to (directly) voting on an acquisition
o⁄er, a mechanism proposed by Bebchuk and Hart (2001) to overcome coordination problems in
takeovers. Like the Bebchuk-Hart mechanism, it resolves the pressure-to-tender problem. If a
majority of shareholders were to eliminate the ceiling, disapproving shareholders would still have
28While voting restrictions partly explain the low level of hostile takeovers in Germany, the hostile bid for Conti-
nental by Pirelli was substantially delayed but not prevented by the voting ceilings (Franks and Mayer, 1998b). On
these accounts, the initial proposal for the European Takeover Directive saw voting ceilings as a primary target of
the break-through rule (McCahery et al., 2004).
33the option to tender. Thus, the latter have no incentives to distort their preferences in the vote due
to hedging considerations. When voting on the removal, shareholders compare pre-takeover share
value with the returns from tendering or retaining their shares, and therefore do not remove the
ceiling when confronted with a value-decreasing bid. Removable ceilings do, however, not overcome
the free-rider problem in case of a value-increasing bid. Once a ceiling is removed by vote, each
shareholder still prefers to retain her share unless the bidder o⁄ers at least the post-takeover share
value.
A special case of restrictions are foreign ownership ceilings. It is often claimed that they serve
to ensure that national champions remain in domestic hands. While this may be true in many or
even most cases, Stulz and Wasserfallen (1995) provide an alternative rationale. In their theoretical
model, a foreign ownership ceiling helps the ￿rm to extract a higher share premium from foreign
investors. They predict that this e⁄ect exists in countries that bene￿t from (international) capital
￿ ight and ￿nd empirical support for this hypothesis in the case of Switzerland.29 Nevertheless,
foreign ownership ceilings protect ￿rms from foreign acquirers.
Priority Shares Priority shares grant their holders extraordinary decision powers in speci￿c
matters. For example, they may entitle them to appoint board members or veto a proposed merger.
Priority shares and its associated privileges are often tied to the identity of the person or institution
that they are issued to, as e.g. governmental authorities (in which case they are commonly called
golden shares). Their holders put (too) much emphasis on their private bene￿ts when taking
decisions, and may block control changes or other decisions that endanger these bene￿ts, against
the interest of the other shareholders. In the case of golden shares, such "private" bene￿ts may
preserve public (national) interests or simply serve self-interested politicians.30 In other cases,
they accrue to corporate insiders. For instance, priority shares in the Netherlands are usually sold
to foundations that are controlled by management-friendly parties or even the company directors
themselves. This endows the board with substantial powers, notably to appoint its own members.
29Supportive evidence is found in studies reporting that ￿rms￿non-voting shares sometimes trade at a premium
over their voting shares when foreign ownership of the latter is restricted (e.g., Odegaard, 2006).
30Government controlled ￿rms may follow political rather than economic objectives (Shleifer, 1998, Shleifer and
Vishny, 1994; Grundmann and M￿slein, 2003). Yet, Bortolotti and Faccio (2006) ￿nd that golden shares need not
harm the other shareholders as the government may be more likely to bail out the ￿rm during distress (despite the fact
that this may deteriorate ex-ante incentives). For wider discussions of the interplay between politics and corporate
control, see Jensen (1991) and Hellwig (2000).
34As a result, an unwanted large shareholder cannot easily obtain control of the ￿rm￿ s key positions,
and insiders are insulated from outside monitoring and hostile takeovers.
Depositary Certi￿cates Another e⁄ective entrenchment device are depositary certi￿cates, which
are common in the Netherlands. These certi￿cates carry the shares￿cash ￿ ow rights but no direct
voting rights. The actual shares of the company are administered by a foundation which in turn
issues the depositary certi￿cates. In order to vote, certi￿cate holders must request a voting proxy
from the foundation. Otherwise, the foundation will exercise the voting rights.31 This typically
leaves the majority of the votes in the hands of a foundation whose board members have links with
the management of the ￿rm (Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2006).
Double Voting Shares In a system of double voting shares, shareholders receive an additional
vote for every share that they have held in their own name for a minimum number of years.32
In France, this privilege can be restricted to shareholders from the European Union, Norway,
Liechtenstein, and Iceland (Knudsen, 2005). Since the double vote is not attached to the share but
is granted to the holder, it cannot be transferred. That is, double voting shares do not constitute
a separate share class and revert to ordinary shares when changing hands.
The system of double voting shares resembles a dual-class share structure consisting of ordinary
voting shares and shares with two votes each. Like dual-class shares, they can serve to consolidate
an incumbent￿ s control and to favor her in control contests (Lannoo, 1999). But in contrast to dual-
class shares, they may impair takeovers even when the incumbent is willing to relinquish control.
Since the double votes are lost in a transaction, the block may no longer command a majority of the
votes in the hands of the bidder. Thus, the incumbent cannot ensure the success of the takeover.
Moreover, when a mandatory bid rule is in place, as in France, the bidder must extend an o⁄er to
all outstanding shares. She cannot price-discriminate between double voting and ordinary shares
because they legally constitute a single class. This is equivalent to having a coattail provision in a
31Another speci￿c feature of the Dutch governance system is the structured regime, which is mandatory for ￿rms
with more than 100 employees or subscribed capital in excess of e11.4M. It transfers numerous powers from the
shareholders to the supervisory board, such as the approval of annual accounts or the election of management and
supervisory directors (Moerland, 2002). Formally, this does not violate the proportionality principle but reduces
shareholder rights in toto.
32The legal provisions for double voting shares in France date back to 1933 and were designed to compensate for
the prohibition of dual-class shares (Conac, 2005). The minimum holding period before the additional vote is granted
is typically two years but can be longer.
35dual-class ￿rm, as it forces the bidder to o⁄er a control premium also to small shareholders (section
III.B). Thus, the mandatory bid rule reinforces the entrenchment e⁄ect of double voting shares.
Double voting shares are defended as protecting ￿rms from myopic investors, who may pressure
managers to pursue short-term pro￿ts at the expense of long-term pro￿tability. Such allegations
have recently been raised against activist hedge funds (Becht et al., 2006; Kahan and Rock, 2006)
and during the 1980s against corporate raiders (Jensen, 1988). In theory, di⁄erent planning horizons
are irrelevant for corporate decisions in perfect capital markets but matter e.g., when information
asymmetries or limits to arbitrage are more severe for long-term assets (Stein, 1988; Shleifer and
Vishny, 1990). However, there is little evidence of myopia in markets and short-termism on part of
institutional investors (Abarbanell and Bernard, 2000; Bushee, 1998).
Lock-in mechanisms are functionally similar to anti-takeover charter amendments.33 Whether
these are bene￿cial or detrimental for shareholders is debated. The arguments largely replicate those
put forward in the controversy about the bene￿ts and costs of contestable control (as described
in sections V.A and V.B). That is, the entrenchment view argues that defensive measures allow
incumbent managers to protect their private bene￿ts at the expense of the shareholders, thereby
hindering an e¢ cient redeployment of corporate assets. By contrast, the shareholder interest view
holds that they protect managers (and ￿rms) from the disruptive e⁄ects of takeovers, enabling
them to e.g., focus on long-term projects. In addition, defensive measures a⁄ect the dynamics of
the tender o⁄er process to the bene￿t of shareholders who lack coordination, by reinforcing the
bargaining role of management on their behalf (Harris, 1990). This may prevent coercive bids
(Bebchuk and Hart, 2001) and promote competition among bidders once the company has come
into play (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986a). The empirical evidence on the e⁄ects of anti-takeover
devices is inconclusive and does not resolve the debate (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Becht et al.,
2003; Burkart and Panunzi, 2006).
Apart from double voting shares, the above mechanisms grant insiders considerable protection
from takeovers, even if they own very few or no cash ￿ ow rights. They are, however, not absolute
defences, as they can be removed by shareholder vote. In addition, voting and ownership ceilings,
33By the end of the 1980s, most S&P 500 ￿rms and a vast majority of those ￿rms listed on the NYSE or the American
Stock Exchange are covered by several anti-takeover devices, including supermajority rules, fair-price amendments,
staggered boards or the authorization of preference shares, which are all subject to shareholder approval (Danielson
and Karpo⁄, 1998; Comment and Schwert, 1995).
36priority shares that empower corporate insiders, and depositary certi￿cates hinder outside moni-
toring. Double voting shares also entrench existing control structures and make friendly control
transfers more di¢ cult, in particular in the presence of the mandatory bid rule.
VII Policy Implications
Since the security-voting structure in￿ uences a ￿rm￿ s control allocation and the incentives of those
entrusted with managing the ￿rm, the question arises whether its choice should be regulated and,
in particular, whether one share - one vote should be mandated. In the public debate, two popular
arguments in support of one share - one vote are shareholder democracy and minority shareholder
protection.
One share - one vote has been promoted on the grounds that it constitutes the natural coun-
terpart of the democratic principle of equal su⁄rage in the corporate context. Yet, the parallel
between these two concepts is rather vague, if not inappropriate (Dunlavy, 2006; Manne, 2007).
Not only does the political one person - one vote rule more naturally translate into a one share-
holder - one vote rule but it even appears to suggest that voting rights should be extended to other
stakeholders of the ￿rm. By contrast, one share - one vote implies that (only) shareholders receive
voting rights in proportion to their economic ownership of the ￿rm; whereas citizens￿voting rights
are neither proportional to their tax payments nor to their share in the public bene￿ts provided
by the government (Allaire, 2006).34 Irrespective of these di⁄erences, it is a priori unclear whether
corporate governance and political governance should adhere to the same principles, as the two
systems operate under di⁄erent premises. For instance, a government has (the legal monopoly
over) police powers, i.e. the use of physical measures to coerce individuals to compel compliance
with its statutes, but corporations do not (Jensen and Meckling, 1983). Also, shareholdings can
usually be traded on secondary markets whereas (at least legally) citizenship cannot (Rodrigues,
2006).
The second popular argument is that one share - one vote protects small shareholders against
(excessive) private bene￿t extraction by controlling minority shareholders (sections IV.B and V.A).
34James Madison (1865) raises the question whether voting rights should be given to every citizen or just to those
who own (economic) property: "In a just and free government...the rights both of property and of persons ought to
be e⁄ectually guarded. Will the former be so in the case of a universal and equal su⁄rage? Will the latter be so in
the case of a su⁄rage con￿ned to the holders of property?"
37The existence of private bene￿ts of control is widely documented (e.g., Doidge, 2004; Dyck and
Zingales, 2004; Nenova, 2003; Zingales, 1995b), and there is also some evidence that dual-class
￿rms create less shareholder wealth, i.e., have on average a lower market valuation (e.g., Claessens
et al., 2002; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003). Yet, even if such a market valuation discount existed,
this would not imply that dual-class ￿rms allocate resources ine¢ ciently. E¢ ciency is measured
by total ￿rm value, i.e. the sum of security bene￿ts and private bene￿ts, and the evidence as to
whether or not private bene￿t extraction by controlling shareholders reduces total ￿rm value is
inconclusive (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). Moreover, it should be noted that private bene￿ts can be
bene￿cial, even if their extraction dissipates value. For instance, they may mitigate the free-rider
problem in takeovers or increase the proceeds from selling a ￿rm, thereby rewarding entrepreneurial
activity (sections III.A.1 and III.B).
Irrespective of e¢ ciency considerations, policy-makers may be concerned about protecting mi-
nority shareholders if the latter systematically underestimate (the consequences of) private bene￿t
extraction.35 Although they may sometimes do so (Ehrhardt and Nowak, 2003), the overall evi-
dence strongly suggests that the extent of private bene￿t extraction is correctly anticipated. That
is, stock returns of dual-class ￿rms are not lower than those of single-class ￿rms (e.g., Core et al.,
2006; Cremer and Nair, 2005; Gompers et al., 2006; Smart et al., 2006).
Alternatively, one may argue that ￿rms in which controlling shareholders are likely to extract
private bene￿ts are more ￿nancially constrained, i.e. have more di¢ culties raising su¢ cient amounts
of outside (equity) capital. For instance, Giannetti and Simonov (2006) document that investors shy
away from ￿rms that they associate with poor corporate governance, including dual-class ￿rms. For
this reason, ￿rms that deviate from one share - one vote may have to forego pro￿table investments
and experience lower growth. From a theoretical perspective, this argument neglects that the
security-voting structure is contractible and alterable. If there is a surplus to be shared from
further investment, the controlling shareholder should be able to suggest an alternative security-
voting structure, e.g. a share class uni￿cation, with an appropriate compensation scheme such that
indeed everyone fares better than under the current structure. Similarly, an entrepreneur who goes
35The growing behavioral ￿nance literature allows for persistently mistaken agents (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 2003;
Stein, 1996). While this in principle creates scope for regulators to protect investors from their own poor decisions,
Daniel et al. (2002) argue that the government should not respond through direct interventions, which are equally
prone to bounded rationality, but through measures that improve private decision-making (e.g. disclosure, reporting
and advertising).
38public is free to choose a security-voting structure that alleviates ￿nancial constraints.
However, regulation may be justi￿ed when agency problems lead shareholders to approve struc-
tures that are against their best interest, e.g., because of managerial in￿ uence over the decision
process, or because of coordination problems (Gordon, 1988; Neeman, 1999).36 Dominant share-
holders, in particular, may take advantage of this possibility to weaken the in￿ uence of minority
shareholders (Gilson, 1987). As a result, an entrepreneur who goes public may be unable to guaran-
tee initial shareholders that their voting rights will not be diluted in the future. This commitment
problem may lead to ￿nancial constraints that cannot be contracted away (Becht et al., 2003).
One possible policy response is to mandate a shareholder vote over any proposed change in the
security-voting structure that would weaken the voting rights of the existing shareholders. In the
US, such changes are currently outright prohibited by the NYSE, the American Stock Exchange
and NASDAQ (Ferrarini, 2006).
As just discussed, neither shareholder democracy nor minority shareholder protection are com-
pelling theoretical reasons to ban dual-class structures in general. Another argument in favour of
regulation is that the security-voting structure preferred by (target) shareholders or ￿rm founders
diverges from the socially optimal structure. For instance, when several bidders compete for a
target ￿rm, one share - one vote is socially optimal but target shareholders tend to prefer a dual-
class share structure to extract more rents from the winning bidder (section III.A.2). In this case,
mandating one share - one vote would increase e¢ ciency.
While this argument supports the use of mandatory rules, theory suggests that the (socially)
optimal security-voting structure is likely to depend on ￿rm speci￿cs and the wider corporate
governance context. In particular, deviations can promote takeover activity in dispersedly held
￿rms (section III.A.1). Thus, no single structure ￿including one share - one vote ￿is in general
optimal, which weakens the case for mandating a speci￿c structure. Hence, a standardized and
narrowly de￿ned rule may exacerbate rather than mitigate ine¢ ciencies, or may distort the relative
competitiveness of di⁄erent ￿rms. It may further lack the ￿ exibility required to adapt to changes in
the corporate environment. More sophisticated rules or case-by-case decisions, on the other hand,
may require information that is di¢ cult or even impossible to obtain for a regulator. Regulatory
36For instance, a (voluntary) dual-class exchange o⁄er can expose dispersed shareholders to a pressure-to-tender
problem (Ruback 1988; Arruæada and Paz-Ares, 1995). See section III.A.1 for a brief description of the pressure-to-
tender problem. Concerns of this kind sparked a policy debate during the US takeover wave of the 1980s when many
￿rms used dual-class recapitalizations to centralize control in the hands of insiders (Fischel, 1987; Seligman, 1986).
39discretion is also susceptible to political capture, which biases the rules towards the interests of
those groups which have most to lose and are most easily organized.37
Theory suggests that the consequences of mandating one share - one vote, in particular whether
or not it improves the control allocation, are unclear for dispersedly held ￿rms. By comparison,
the theoretical predictions are clear-cut for ￿rms with controlling owners: One share - one vote
is most conducive to an e¢ cient control allocation (section III.B). Therefore, one may conclude
that the decision to mandate one share - one vote should be taken in view of the e⁄ects it has
on ￿rms with controlling minority shareholders, not least because many dual-class ￿rms have such
an ownership structure. Accordingly, the rationale for mandating one share - one vote ought to
be based on the perceived gains from weakening controlling minority shareholders and promoting
control contestability. From a theoretical perspective, it is, however, unclear whether these gains
would indeed materialize.
First, while actual takeovers allow more e¢ cient owners and managers to gain control, takeovers
- like other governance mechanisms such as active owners - are not free of agency problems. For
instance, takeovers may be driven by managerial motives (empire building), rather than by value
improvements. Similarly, the takeover threat disciplines managerial behavior but also exacerbates
agency problems, when managers primarily take actions to protect their position. Mandating one
share - one vote may even discourage entrepreneurs from undertaking investments or going public
for fear of losing their grip on control when raising outside equity.
Second, one share - one vote increases the cost of accumulating votes and weakens the in￿ uence
of minority blockholders, which may discourage active ownership. While this mitigates the con￿ ict
among shareholders, it also strengthens the position of managers, thereby aggravating the manager-
shareholder con￿ ict. Whether contestable managers or entrenched owners are more prone to run
￿rms e¢ ciently or to act in the small shareholders￿interest is debatable (Bolton and von Thadden,
1998). Managers are more vulnerable to hostile takeovers, but have a much smaller stake in the
￿rm. Hence, a prerequisite for a consistent argument in favour of one share - one vote must be the
assessment that the costs of entrenchment outweigh the bene￿ts of alignment. Or in other words,
the policy must be based on the con￿dence that managers are su¢ ciently disciplined by other gov-
ernance mechanisms, such as legal protection, strong boards or a well-functioning takeover market
37For instance, Romano (1987) and Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999) argue that regulations are likely to re￿ ect
primarily the interests of managers because they have greater lobbying power than dispersed shareholders.
40(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). However, concentrated ownership structures tend to be prevalent in
countries in which other governance mechanisms are weaker.38 This suggests that improvements in
the general corporate governance environment should precede any intervention directly aimed at
discouraging blockownership (Bergl￿f and Burkart, 2003).
Even if a speci￿c security-voting structure were unambiguously optimal, mandating this struc-
ture raises some intricate issues. First, should holders of disproportionate voting rights be compen-
sated in stock uni￿cations, and if yes what scheme should be used? Uni￿cations are essentially a
sale of voting power from superior vote to inferior vote shareholders. While voluntary uni￿cations
imply mutually bene￿cial terms of trade, mandated uni￿cations must specify (a procedure to deter-
mine) the terms of this transaction, as the parties are bound to disagree. The regulator￿ s problem
is that the parties are neither inclined to reveal their information nor to bargain voluntarily due
to the inherent redistribution.39 Therefore, any speci￿c procedure is likely to be biased in favour
of one party at the expense of the other, thus leading to ambiguous wealth e⁄ects (Bergstr￿m and
Rydqvist, 1990; Bigelli et al., 2007; Hauser and Lauterbach, 2004). Neither can this redistributional
con￿ ict be removed by selling the entire ￿rm in a bidding contest among single-class (shell) com-
panies. A majority shareholder would always ensure that the bidder o⁄ering her the most generous
compensation wins the contest. To avoid this outcome, her voting power would have to be diluted
prior to the contest, which brings back the initial question of how to compensate superior vote
shareholders in uni￿cations.
Second, shareholders may evade (the spirit of) one share - one vote by resorting to alternative
means of separating cash ￿ ow and voting rights. For instance, a prohibition of di⁄erential voting
rights may cause ￿rms to shift from dual-class share structures to pyramids (Bebchuk and Hart,
2002). Alternatively, shareholders may use derivative transactions to dispose of their cash ￿ ow
rights or to borrow votes. On the one hand, this may be less desirable as pyramids and derivative
transaction seem more opaque. In addition, pyramids create less liquid markets for the cash ￿ ow
rights of the ￿rm (Becht, 1999). On the other hand, discouraging these forms of deviations, while in
38This does not apply to countries where shareholder rights are relatively restricted such that votes confer little
control over board and top management. In this case, owning a large block yields costs but little economic bene￿ts.
39The case of the Siemens AG in Germany illustrates some of these di¢ culties (McCahery et al., 2004): The
shareholders decided to abolish a special share class without compensation, and in response the Siemens family
sued the ￿rm for compensation. The claim was ￿rst acknowledged by a Munich court, which awarded the family a
compensation of about EUR 32 million based on past price di⁄erences, but the decision was later reversed by the
Higher Court of Bavaria.
41principle possible, may impair their other important functions. As mentioned in the introduction,
conglomerate structures may create internal markets that substitute for missing institutions and
external markets plagued by frictions (Khanna and Yafeh, 2006). Similarly, derivative transactions
improve risk-sharing among shareholders, speculative price discovery and market liquidity.
The above reservations against mandating one share - one vote do not imply that there should
be no limitations on the extent or methods of deviating from the proportionality principle. Even
if no single structure ought to be mandated, some harmonization across di⁄erent jurisdictions is
desirable if this increases market transparency or if regulatory competition impairs the emergence
of socially optimal rules (Bebchuk and Ferrell, 1999; Monks and Minow, 1995). For instance, states
that compete to attract incorporations or want to keep national champions under domestic control
may bias their legislation in favor of corporate insiders. In any case, many national di⁄erences
seem to be largely a matter of formality: All types of shares with di⁄erential voting rights serve
the common purpose of separating cash ￿ ow rights and voting rights.
In addition, regulating dual-class recapitalizations or other midstream changes in the security-
voting structure that dilute the voting rights of existing shareholders may help overcome commit-
ment problems. For instance, one could allow dual-class recapitalizations only when they do not
weaken the voting rights of existing shareholder groups. This would enable dominant shareholders
to raise additional funds without having to surrender control, while preventing any consolidation
of control at the expense of existing shareholders.
Finally, the verdict in the case of voting and ownership ceilings, priority shares that empower
corporate insiders, and depositary certi￿cates is less ambiguous. These lock-in mechanisms prevent
individual shareholders from exerting substantial in￿ uence or disempower shareholders as a group,
thereby granting insiders considerable protection from both takeovers and shareholder activism.
While it is sometimes claimed that this protects minority shareholders, the lack of constraints on
managerial behavior is hard to justify theoretically.
VIII Concluding Remarks
The impact of deviations from one share - one vote on the outcome of takeover bids crucially depends
on the context, notably on the ownership structure. For dispersedly held ￿rms, no speci￿c security-
42voting structure is in general most conducive to an e¢ cient control allocation. When several bidders
compete, one share - one vote always allocates control to the most e¢ cient bidder. In the absence of
bidding competition, non-voting shares mitigate the free-rider problem, thereby promoting takeover
activity. In either case, the socially optimal structure diverges from the structure that target
shareholders prefer.
Outside takeovers, there appears to be no role for the security-voting structure in widely held
￿rms. In the presence of an outside blockholder, leveraging her voting power can enhance the
e¢ cacy of monitoring. The verdict for lock-in mechanisms, such as depositary certi￿cates, voting
restrictions and priority shares, is less ambiguous. They insulate managers from both takeovers
and e⁄ective shareholder monitoring.
For ￿rms with a controlling shareholder, one share - one vote promotes value-increasing control
transfers and deters value-decreasing control transfers more e⁄ectively than any other structure,
but does not ensure an e¢ cient control allocation in general. Furthermore, concentrated voting
power protects the insider from the disciplinary e⁄ect of hostile takeovers, and the small equity
stake simultaneously provides little alignment with the minority shareholders. Hence, she has the
power and the incentives to extract private bene￿ts at the expense of the security bene￿ts (share
value).
Even so, private bene￿t extraction is not a compelling argument for restricting contractual
freedom, unless there would be good reasons to believe that investors fail to anticipate the insider￿ s
opportunistic behavior. A more sound argument for regulatory intervention is the divergence be-
tween socially and privately optimal security-voting structures. Most importantly, entrepreneurs
have a preference for controlling minority structures, even though they hinder an e¢ cient realloca-
tion of control. Accordingly, the rationale for mandating one share - one vote must be to weaken
controlling shareholders, thereby increasing control contestability and promoting value-increasing
takeovers. However, to evaluate the merits of this policy, one needs to compare not only the costs
and bene￿ts of controlling minority structures but also the costs and bene￿ts of the alternative:
the managerially controlled ￿rm.
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